HL7.TERMINOLOGY\SecurityTrustObservationValue

This page is part of the HL7 Terminology (v2.1.0: Release) based on FHIR R4. The current version which supercedes this version is 5.2.0. For a full list of available versions, see the Directory of published versions

ValueSet: SecurityTrustObservationValue

Summary

Defining URL:

http://terminology.hl7.org/ValueSet/v3-SecurityTrustObservationValue

Version:

2.0.0

Name:

SecurityTrustObservationValue

Status:

Active as of 2014-08-07

Definition:

Values for security metadata observation made about aspects of trust applicable to an IT resource (data, information object, service, or system capability). Trust applicable to IT resources is established and maintained in and among security domains, and may be comprised of observations about the domainâ€™s trust authority, trust framework, trust policy, trust interaction rules, means for assessing and monitoring adherence to trust policies, mechanisms that enforce trust, and quality and reliability measures of assurance in those mechanisms. [Based on ISO IEC 10181-1 and NIST SP 800-63-2]

OID:

2.16.840.1.113883.1.11.20538 (for OID based terminology systems)

Source Resource:

XML / JSON / Turtle

References

This value set is not used here; it may be used elsewhere (e.g. specifications and/or implementations that use this content)

Logical Definition (CLD)

Include codes from http://terminology.hl7.org/CodeSystem/v3-ObservationValue where concept is-a SECTRSTOBV

Expansion

This value set contains 36 concepts

Expansion based on ObservationValue v2.1.0 (CodeSystem)

All codes from system http://terminology.hl7.org/CodeSystem/v3-ObservationValue

Lvl	Code	Display	Definition
0	SECTRSTOBV	security trust observation	Observation value used to indicate aspects of trust applicable to an IT resource (data, information object, service, or system capability).
1	TRSTACCRDOBV	trust accreditation observation	Values for security trust accreditation metadata observation made about the formal declaration by an authority or neutral third party that validates the technical, security, trust, and business practice conformance of Trust Agents to facilitate security, interoperability, and trust among participants within a security domain or trust framework.
1	TRSTAGREOBV	trust agreement observation	Values for security trust agreement metadata observation made about privacy and security requirements with which a security domain must comply. \[ISO IEC 10181-1\] \[ISO IEC 10181-1\]
1	TRSTCERTOBV	trust certificate observation	Values for security trust certificate metadata observation made about a set of security-relevant data issued by a security authority or trusted third party, together with security information which is used to provide the integrity and data origin authentication services for an IT resource (data, information object, service, or system capability). \[Based on ISO IEC 10181-1\] For example, a Certificate Policy (CP), which is a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements. A particular Certificate Policy might indicate the applicability of a type of certificate to the authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the trading of goods within a given price range. Another example is Cross Certification with Federal Bridge.
1	TRSTFWKOBV	none supplied 5	Values for security trust framework metadata observation made about a complete set of contracts, regulations or commitments that enable participating actors to rely on certain assertions by other actors to fulfill their information security requirements. \[Kantara Initiative\]
1	TRSTLOAOBV	trust assurance observation	Values for security trust assurance metadata observation made about the digital quality or reliability of a trust assertion, activity, capability, information exchange, mechanism, process, or protocol.
2	LOAAN	authentication level of assurance value	The value assigned as the indicator of the digital quality or reliability of the verification and validation process used to verify the claimed identity of an entity by securely associating an identifier and its authenticator. \[Based on ISO 7498-2\] For example, the degree of confidence in the vetting process used to establish the identity of the individual to whom the credential was issued, and 2) the degree of confidence that the individual who uses the credential is the individual to whom the credential was issued. \[OMB M-04-04 E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies\]
3	LOAAN1	low authentication level of assurance	Indicator of low digital quality or reliability of the digital reliability of the verification and validation process used to verify the claimed identity of an entity by securely associating an identifier and its authenticator. \[Based on ISO 7498-2\] The degree of confidence in the vetting process used to establish the identity of the individual to whom the credential was issued, and 2) the degree of confidence that the individual who uses the credential is the individual to whom the credential was issued. \[OMB M-04-04 E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies\] Low authentication level of assurance indicates that the relying party may have little or no confidence in the asserted identity's validity. Level 1 requires little or no confidence in the asserted identity. No identity proofing is required at this level, but the authentication mechanism should provide some assurance that the same claimant is accessing the protected transaction or data. A wide range of available authentication technologies can be employed and any of the token methods of Levels 2, 3, or 4, including Personal Identification Numbers (PINs), may be used. To be authenticated, the claimant must prove control of the token through a secure authentication protocol. At Level 1, long-term shared authentication secrets may be revealed to verifiers. Assertions issued about claimants as a result of a successful authentication are either cryptographically authenticated by relying parties (using approved methods) or are obtained directly from a trusted party via a secure authentication protocol. \[Summary of the technical requirements specified in NIST SP 800-63 for the four levels of assurance defined by the December 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies.\]
3	LOAAN2	basic authentication level of assurance	Indicator of basic digital quality or reliability of the digital reliability of the verification and validation process used to verify the claimed identity of an entity by securely associating an identifier and its authenticator. \[Based on ISO 7498-2\] The degree of confidence in the vetting process used to establish the identity of the individual to whom the credential was issued, and 2) the degree of confidence that the individual who uses the credential is the individual to whom the credential was issued. \[OMB M-04-04 E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies\] Basic authentication level of assurance indicates that the relying party may have some confidence in the asserted identity's validity. Level 2 requires confidence that the asserted identity is accurate. Level 2 provides for single-factor remote network authentication, including identity-proofing requirements for presentation of identifying materials or information. A wide range of available authentication technologies can be employed, including any of the token methods of Levels 3 or 4, as well as passwords. Successful authentication requires that the claimant prove through a secure authentication protocol that the claimant controls the token. Eavesdropper, replay, and online guessing attacks are prevented. Long-term shared authentication secrets, if used, are never revealed to any party except the claimant and verifiers operated by the CSP; however, session (temporary) shared secrets may be provided to independent verifiers by the CSP. Approved cryptographic techniques are required. Assertions issued about claimants as a result of a successful authentication are either cryptographically authenticated by relying parties (using approved methods) or are obtained directly from a trusted party via a secure authentication protocol. \[Summary of the technical requirements specified in NIST SP 800-63 for the four levels of assurance defined by the December 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies.\]
3	LOAAN3	medium authentication level of assurance	Indicator of medium digital quality or reliability of the digital reliability of verification and validation of the process used to verify the claimed identity of an entity by securely associating an identifier and its authenticator. \[Based on ISO 7498-2\] The degree of confidence in the vetting process used to establish the identity of the individual to whom the credential was issued, and 2) the degree of confidence that the individual who uses the credential is the individual to whom the credential was issued. \[OMB M-04-04 E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies\] Medium authentication level of assurance indicates that the relying party may have high confidence in the asserted identity's validity. Level 3 is appropriate for transactions that need high confidence in the accuracy of the asserted identity. Level 3 provides multifactor remote network authentication. At this level, identity-proofing procedures require verification of identifying materials and information. Authentication is based on proof of possession of a key or password through a cryptographic protocol. Cryptographic strength mechanisms should protect the primary authentication token (a cryptographic key) against compromise by the protocol threats, including eavesdropper, replay, online guessing, verifier impersonation, and man-in-the-middle attacks. A minimum of two authentication factors is required. Three kinds of tokens may be used: * "soft" cryptographic token, which has the key stored on a general-purpose computer, * "hard" cryptographic token, which has the key stored on a special hardware device, and * "one-time password" device token, which has symmetric key stored on a personal hardware device that is a cryptographic module validated at FIPS 140-2 Level 1 or higher. Validation testing of cryptographic modules and algorithms for conformance to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, is managed by NIST. Authentication requires that the claimant prove control of the token through a secure authentication protocol. The token must be unlocked with a password or biometric representation, or a password must be used in a secure authentication protocol, to establish two-factor authentication. Long-term shared authentication secrets, if used, are never revealed to any party except the claimant and verifiers operated directly by the CSP; however, session (temporary) shared secrets may be provided to independent verifiers by the CSP. Approved cryptographic techniques are used for all operations. Assertions issued about claimants as a result of a successful authentication are either cryptographically authenticated by relying parties (using approved methods) or are obtained directly from a trusted party via a secure authentication protocol. \[Summary of the technical requirements specified in NIST SP 800-63 for the four levels of assurance defined by the December 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies.\]
3	LOAAN4	high authentication level of assurance	Indicator of high digital quality or reliability of the digital reliability of the verification and validation process used to verify the claimed identity of an entity by securely associating an identifier and its authenticator. \[Based on ISO 7498-2\] The degree of confidence in the vetting process used to establish the identity of the individual to whom the credential was issued, and 2) the degree of confidence that the individual who uses the credential is the individual to whom the credential was issued. \[OMB M-04-04 E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies\] High authentication level of assurance indicates that the relying party may have very high confidence in the asserted identity's validity. Level 4 is for transactions that need very high confidence in the accuracy of the asserted identity. Level 4 provides the highest practical assurance of remote network authentication. Authentication is based on proof of possession of a key through a cryptographic protocol. This level is similar to Level 3 except that only â€œhardâ€? cryptographic tokens are allowed, cryptographic module validation requirements are strengthened, and subsequent critical data transfers must be authenticated via a key that is bound to the authentication process. The token should be a hardware cryptographic module validated at FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or higher overall with at least FIPS 140-2 Level 3 physical security. This level requires a physical token, which cannot readily be copied, and operator authentication at Level 2 and higher, and ensures good, two-factor remote authentication. Level 4 requires strong cryptographic authentication of all parties and all sensitive data transfers between the parties. Either public key or symmetric key technology may be used. Authentication requires that the claimant prove through a secure authentication protocol that the claimant controls the token. Eavesdropper, replay, online guessing, verifier impersonation, and man-in-the-middle attacks are prevented. Long-term shared authentication secrets, if used, are never revealed to any party except the claimant and verifiers operated directly by the CSP; however, session (temporary) shared secrets may be provided to independent verifiers by the CSP. Strong approved cryptographic techniques are used for all operations. All sensitive data transfers are cryptographically authenticated using keys bound to the authentication process. \[Summary of the technical requirements specified in NIST SP 800-63 for the four levels of assurance defined by the December 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies.\]
2	LOAAP	authentication process level of assurance value	The value assigned as the indicator of the digital quality or reliability of a defined sequence of messages between a Claimant and a Verifier that demonstrates that the Claimant has possession and control of a valid token to establish his/her identity, and optionally, demonstrates to the Claimant that he or she is communicating with the intended Verifier. \[Based on NIST SP 800-63-2\]
3	LOAAP1	low authentication process level of assurance	Indicator of the low digital quality or reliability of a defined sequence of messages between a Claimant and a Verifier that demonstrates that the Claimant has possession and control of a valid token to establish his/her identity, and optionally, demonstrates to the Claimant that he or she is communicating with the intended Verifier. \[Based on NIST SP 800-63-2\] Low authentication process level of assurance indicates that (1) long-term shared authentication secrets may be revealed to verifiers; and (2) assertions and assertion references require protection from manufacture/modification and reuse attacks. \[Summary of the technical requirements specified in NIST SP 800-63 for the four levels of assurance defined by the December 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies.\]
3	LOAAP2	basic authentication process level of assurance	Indicator of the basic digital quality or reliability of a defined sequence of messages between a Claimant and a Verifier that demonstrates that the Claimant has possession and control of a valid token to establish his/her identity, and optionally, demonstrates to the Claimant that he or she is communicating with the intended Verifier. \[Based on NIST SP 800-63-2\] Basic authentication process level of assurance indicates that long-term shared authentication secrets are never revealed to any other party except Credential Service Provider (CSP). Sessions (temporary) shared secrets may be provided to independent verifiers by CSP. Long-term shared authentication secrets, if used, are never revealed to any other party except Verifiers operated by the Credential Service Provider (CSP); however, session (temporary) shared secrets may be provided to independent Verifiers by the CSP. In addition to Level 1 requirements, assertions are resistant to disclosure, redirection, capture and substitution attacks. Approved cryptographic techniques are required. \[Summary of the technical requirements specified in NIST SP 800-63 for the four levels of assurance defined by the December 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies.\]
3	LOAAP3	medium authentication process level of assurance	Indicator of the medium digital quality or reliability of a defined sequence of messages between a Claimant and a Verifier that demonstrates that the Claimant has possession and control of a valid token to establish his/her identity, and optionally, demonstrates to the Claimant that he or she is communicating with the intended Verifier. \[Based on NIST SP 800-63-2\] Medium authentication process level of assurance indicates that the token can be unlocked with password, biometric, or uses a secure multi-token authentication protocol to establish two-factor authentication. Long-term shared authentication secrets are never revealed to any party except the Claimant and Credential Service Provider (CSP). Authentication requires that the Claimant prove, through a secure authentication protocol, that he or she controls the token. The Claimant unlocks the token with a password or biometric, or uses a secure multi-token authentication protocol to establish two-factor authentication (through proof of possession of a physical or software token in combination with some memorized secret knowledge). Long-term shared authentication secrets, if used, are never revealed to any party except the Claimant and Verifiers operated directly by the CSP; however, session (temporary) shared secrets may be provided to independent Verifiers by the CSP. In addition to Level 2 requirements, assertions are protected against repudiation by the Verifier.
3	LOAAP4	high authentication process level of assurance	Indicator of the high digital quality or reliability of a defined sequence of messages between a Claimant and a Verifier that demonstrates that the Claimant has possession and control of a valid token to establish his/her identity, and optionally, demonstrates to the Claimant that he or she is communicating with the intended Verifier. \[Based on NIST SP 800-63-2\] High authentication process level of assurance indicates all sensitive data transfer are cryptographically authenticated using keys bound to the authentication process. Level 4 requires strong cryptographic authentication of all communicating parties and all sensitive data transfers between the parties. Either public key or symmetric key technology may be used. Authentication requires that the Claimant prove through a secure authentication protocol that he or she controls the token. All protocol threats at Level 3 are required to be prevented at Level 4. Protocols shall also be strongly resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks. Long-term shared authentication secrets, if used, are never revealed to any party except the Claimant and Verifiers operated directly by the CSP; however, session (temporary) shared secrets may be provided to independent Verifiers by the CSP. Approved cryptographic techniques are used for all operations. All sensitive data transfers are cryptographically authenticated using keys bound to the authentication process. \[Summary of the technical requirements specified in NIST SP 800-63 for the four levels of assurance defined by the December 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies.\]
2	LOAAS	assertion level of assurance value	The value assigned as the indicator of the high quality or reliability of the statement from a Verifier to a Relying Party (RP) that contains identity information about a Subscriber. Assertions may also contain verified attributes.
3	LOAAS1	low assertion level of assurance	Indicator of the low quality or reliability of the statement from a Verifier to a Relying Party (RP) that contains identity information about a Subscriber. Assertions may also contain verified attributes. Assertions and assertion references require protection from modification and reuse attacks. \[Summary of the technical requirements specified in NIST SP 800-63 for the four levels of assurance defined by the December 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies.\]
3	LOAAS2	basic assertion level of assurance	Indicator of the basic quality or reliability of the statement from a Verifier to a Relying Party (RP) that contains identity information about a Subscriber. Assertions may also contain verified attributes. Assertions are resistant to disclosure, redirection, capture and substitution attacks. Approved cryptographic techniques are required for all assertion protocols. \[Summary of the technical requirements specified in NIST SP 800-63 for the four levels of assurance defined by the December 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies.\]
3	LOAAS3	medium assertion level of assurance	Indicator of the medium quality or reliability of the statement from a Verifier to a Relying Party (RP) that contains identity information about a Subscriber. Assertions may also contain verified attributes. Assertions are protected against repudiation by the verifier. \[Summary of the technical requirements specified in NIST SP 800-63 for the four levels of assurance defined by the December 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies.\]
3	LOAAS4	high assertion level of assurance	Indicator of the high quality or reliability of the statement from a Verifier to a Relying Party (RP) that contains identity information about a Subscriber. Assertions may also contain verified attributes. Strongly resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks. "Bearer" assertions are not used. "Holder-of-key" assertions may be used. RP maintains records of the assertions. \[Summary of the technical requirements specified in NIST SP 800-63 for the four levels of assurance defined by the December 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies.\]
2	LOACM	token and credential management level of assurance value)	Indicator of the digital quality or reliability of the activities performed by the Credential Service Provider (CSP) subsequent to electronic authentication registration, identity proofing and issuance activities to manage and safeguard the integrity of an issued credential and its binding to an identity. \[Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
3	LOACM1	low token and credential management level of assurance	Indicator of the low digital quality or reliability of the activities performed by the Credential Service Provider (CSP) subsequent to electronic authentication registration, identity proofing and issuance activities to manage and safeguard the integrity of an issued credential and its binding to an identity. Little or no confidence that an individual has maintained control over a token that has been entrusted to him or her and that that token has not been compromised. Characteristics include weak identity binding to tokens and plaintext passwords or secrets not transmitted across a network. \[Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
3	LOACM2	basic token and credential management level of assurance	Indicator of the basic digital quality or reliability of the activities performed by the Credential Service Provider (CSP) subsequent to electronic authentication registration, identity proofing and issuance activities to manage and safeguard the integrity of an issued credential and its binding to an identity. Some confidence that an individual has maintained control over a token that has been entrusted to him or her and that that token has not been compromised. Characteristics include: Verification must prove claimant controls the token; token resists online guessing, replay, session hijacking, and eavesdropping attacks; and token is at least weakly resistant to man-in-the middle attacks. \[Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
3	LOACM3	medium token and credential management level of assurance	Indicator of the medium digital quality or reliability of the activities performed by the Credential Service Provider (CSP) subsequent to electronic authentication registration, identity proofing and issuance activities to manage and safeguard the integrity of an issued credential and itâ€™s binding to an identity. High confidence that an individual has maintained control over a token that has been entrusted to him or her and that that token has not been compromised. Characteristics include: Ownership of token verifiable through security authentication protocol and credential management protects against verifier impersonation attacks. \[Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
3	LOACM4	high token and credential management level of assurance	Indicator of the high digital quality or reliability of the activities performed by the Credential Service Provider (CSP) subsequent to electronic authentication registration, identity proofing and issuance activities to manage and safeguard the integrity of an issued credential and itâ€™s binding to an identity. Very high confidence that an individual has maintained control over a token that has been entrusted to him or her and that that token has not been compromised. Characteristics include: Verifier can prove control of token through a secure protocol; credential management supports strong cryptographic authentication of all communication parties. \[Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
2	LOAID	identity proofing level of assurance	Indicator of the quality or reliability in the process of ascertaining that an individual is who he or she claims to be.
3	LOAID1	low identity proofing level of assurance	Indicator of low digital quality or reliability in the process of ascertaining that an individual is who he or she claims to be. Requires that a continuity of identity be maintained but does not require identity proofing. \[Based on Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
3	LOAID2	basic identity proofing level of assurance	Indicator of some digital quality or reliability in the process of ascertaining that that an individual is who he or she claims to be. Requires identity proofing via presentation of identifying material or information. \[Based on Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
3	LOAID3	medium identity proofing level of assurance	Indicator of high digital quality or reliability in the process of ascertaining that an individual is who he or she claims to be. Requires identity proofing procedures for verification of identifying materials and information. \[Based on Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
3	LOAID4	high identity proofing level of assurance	Indicator of high digital quality or reliability in the process of ascertaining that an individual is who he or she claims to be. Requires identity proofing procedures for verification of identifying materials and information. \[Based on Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
2	LOANR	non-repudiation level of assurance value	Indicator of the digital quality or reliability in the process of establishing proof of delivery and proof of origin. \[Based on ISO 7498-2\]
3	LOANR1	low non-repudiation level of assurance	Indicator of low digital quality or reliability in the process of establishing proof of delivery and proof of origin. \[Based on ISO 7498-2\]
3	LOANR2	basic non-repudiation level of assurance	Indicator of basic digital quality or reliability in the process of establishing proof of delivery and proof of origin. \[Based on ISO 7498-2\]
3	LOANR3	medium non-repudiation level of assurance	Indicator of medium digital quality or reliability in the process of establishing proof of delivery and proof of origin. \[Based on ISO 7498-2\]
3	LOANR4	high non-repudiation level of assurance	Indicator of high digital quality or reliability in the process of establishing proof of delivery and proof of origin. \[Based on ISO 7498-2\]
2	LOARA	remote access level of assurance value	Indicator of the digital quality or reliability of the information exchange between network-connected devices where the information cannot be reliably protected end-to-end by a single organizationâ€™s security controls. \[Based on NIST SP 800-63-2\]
3	LOARA1	low remote access level of assurance	Indicator of low digital quality or reliability of the information exchange between network-connected devices where the information cannot be reliably protected end-to-end by a single organizationâ€™s security controls. \[Based on NIST SP 800-63-2\]
3	LOARA2	basic remote access level of assurance	Indicator of basic digital quality or reliability of the information exchange between network-connected devices where the information cannot be reliably protected end-to-end by a single organizationâ€™s security controls. \[Based on NIST SP 800-63-2\]
3	LOARA3	medium remote access level of assurance	Indicator of medium digital quality or reliability of the information exchange between network-connected devices where the information cannot be reliably protected end-to-end by a single organizationâ€™s security controls. \[Based on NIST SP 800-63-2\]
3	LOARA4	high remote access level of assurance	Indicator of high digital quality or reliability of the information exchange between network-connected devices where the information cannot be reliably protected end-to-end by a single organization's security controls. \[Based on NIST SP 800-63-2\]
2	LOATK	token level of assurance value	Indicator of the digital quality or reliability of single and multi-token authentication. \[Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
3	LOATK1	low token level of assurance	Indicator of the low digital quality or reliability of single and multi-token authentication. Permits the use of any of the token methods of Levels 2, 3, or 4. \[Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
3	LOATK2	basic token level of assurance	Indicator of the basic digital quality or reliability of single and multi-token authentication. Requires single factor authentication using memorized secret tokens, pre-registered knowledge tokens, look-up secret tokens, out of band tokens, or single factor one-time password devices. \[Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
3	LOATK3	medium token level of assurance	Indicator of the medium digital quality or reliability of single and multi-token authentication. Requires two authentication factors. Provides multi-factor remote network authentication. Permits multi-factor software cryptographic token. \[Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
3	LOATK4	high token level of assurance	Indicator of the high digital quality or reliability of single and multi-token authentication. Requires token that is a hardware cryptographic module validated at validated at Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 Level 2 or higher overall with at least FIPS 140-2 Level 3 physical security. Level 4 token requirements can be met by using the PIV authentication key of a FIPS 201 compliant Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Card. \[Electronic Authentication Guideline - Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, Dec 2011\]
1	TRSTMECOBV	none supplied 6	Values for security trust mechanism metadata observation made about a security architecture system component that supports enforcement of security policies.

Explanation of the columns that may appear on this page:

Level

A few code lists that FHIR defines are hierarchical - each code is assigned a level. In this scheme, some codes are under other codes, and imply that the code they are under also applies

Source

The source of the definition of the code (when the value set draws in codes defined elsewhere)

Code

The code (used as the code in the resource instance)

Display

The display (used in the display element of a Coding). If there is no display, implementers should not simply display the code, but map the concept into their application

Definition

An explanation of the meaning of the concept

Comments

Additional notes about how to use the code

History

Date

Action

Author

Custodian

Comment

2020-05-06

revise

Ted Klein

Vocabulary WG

Migrated to the UTG maintenance environment and publishing tooling.

2014-08-07

revise

FHIR (Kathleen Connor) (no record of original request)

2014T2_2014-08-07_001306 (RIM release ID)

Add ActTrustPolicyType concept domain to ActPolicyType branch of the ActCode concept domain. Add TrustPolicy concept codes to the Act.code system. Add 15 value sets binding c:TrustPolicy to 15 Concept Domains.